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Abstract 
 
This explanatory research reviews the economic impact literature to identify the 
conditions that would theoretically allow any sport, large or small, to generate positive economic 
effects.  Nine conditions are identified that, when present, could allow a community to 
experience a positive economic impact from a team or stadium.  The nine conditions are then 
used to explain the discrepancy in known empirical outcomes in Major and Minor League 
Baseball.  It appears as if major league teams are more likely to violate the conditions while 
minor league teams are not. This research finds theoretical support for previous suggestions that 
smaller teams and events may be beneficial to local economies.  In doing so, it also explains 
previous empirical results that found some minor league baseball classifications are associated 
with positive gains in per capita income.  
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Introduction 
Despite the lofty perception that teams and professional sporting leagues are useful 
economic development tools, most academic research has failed to support this contention.  Ex 
post analysis of professional sports teams on a variety of economic indicators imply almost 
entirely insignificant or negative effects (e.g. Baade, 1996; Baade & Sanderson, 1997; Coates & 
Humphreys, 1999, 2001, 2003; Lertwachara & Cochran, 2007; Miller, 2002).   
Notwithstanding the weight of broad economic evidence on major league sports, some 
authors (Matheson, 2006; Seaman, 2004) have suggested that smaller teams and amateur events 
may have a greater propensity to positively affect local economies.  Indeed, a recent empirical 
analysis of all 238 metropolitan areas that hosted a minor league team between 1985 and 2006 
(Agha, 2013) found that AAA teams, A+ teams, AA stadiums, and rookie stadiums are 
associated with gains in local per capita income.  
While Agha (2013) empirically answered Matheson’s (2006) and Seaman’s (2004) call 
for ex post research on smaller sporting entities, no research to date has explained why there are 
different effects between major and minor league teams.  Thus, the purpose of this explanatory 
research is to review the economic impact literature to identify the conditions that would 
theoretically allow any sport, large or small, to generate positive economic effects.  After 
identifying these conditions, they are applied to known empirical results on the economic impact 
of both Major League Baseball (MLB) and Minor League Baseball (MiLB) to explain why there 
are seemingly contradictory results.  The outcome will be a more thorough understanding of 
economic impact and the conditions that are necessary for a team, large or small, to have an 
impact on its community. 
In total, nine conditions are identified that, alone or in combination, could allow a 
community to experience a positive economic impact from a team.  Table 1 summarizes these 
conditions.   
Table 1: Nine Conditions that Affect Economic Impact 
1. New visitors 
2. Geographic isolation 
3. Locals change spending 
4. Locals stay locally 
5. Leakages 
6. Government spending 
7. New stadium 
8. Venue utilization 
9. Crowding out 
 
When applied to MLB and MiLB, these nine conditions provide compelling explanations 
for the different economic impacts found in MLB and MiLB.  More specifically, it appears as if 
minor league teams are more likely to be located in small markets with few alternative leisure 
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activities.  In addition, minor league stadiums are more likely to have high utilization rates, thus 
increasing the opportunities to draw visitors and their associated spending into a local economy.  
Finally, the absence of substantial crowding out effects and low levels of leakages may be unique 
to small teams (or small markets).  These fundamental structural differences between minor 
league and major league baseball are likely the cause of the differential impacts that are seen 
across the two leagues. 
The differential economic impacts between large and small teams have implications for 
sport managers, city officials, and event organizers who believe that attracting a professional 
team will lead to certain gains.  Evidence is beginning to show that smaller sports may be more 
successful in generating positive economic impacts. 
We begin with a brief explanation of economic impact.  Next, each of the nine conditions 
will be explained and then applied to our current state of knowledge in both major and minor 
league baseball.  In some cases, considerable research has been conducted on a particular 
condition.  In other cases, there is no research and we have only general statistics, anecdotes, and 
illustrative examples available.  These cases contribute to a clear accounting of the gaps that 
exist in the academic literature in each of these nine areas.  Throughout the application of the 
conditions to baseball we address the discrepancy between major and minor league results for 
each condition and in doing so explain why the differences exist.  The paper is organized by each 
of the nine conditions with an investigation into each condition before moving onto the next one. 
To be clear, despite a plethora of research on the economic impact of sporting events, we 
focus here on the case of sports teams, specifically Major League Baseball (MLB) and Minor 
League Baseball (MiLB). 
 
Economic Impact 
 For decades economic impact studies have been commissioned from private consulting 
firms as tools to justify public expenditures for new stadiums, sway public opinion before 
elections, and help teams understand their value to communities.  These studies are often 
performed incorrectly using inflated multipliers, misleading data, or overly optimistic projections 
(Crompton, 1995).  Regardless of the truthfulness of economic impact studies, the reality is they 
are still conducted regularly for a variety of teams and events throughout the U.S. and the world. 
But what is economic impact really trying to measure?  Economic impact is the net 
economic change in a local economy resulting from spending attributed to a given activity.  
Theoretically, any activity or business has the potential to generate new spending that would not 
have occurred in its absence.  In the sporting context, that activity can be a team, stadium, or an 
actual participatory or spectator event.  These activities draw people to a given location who 
spend money on lodging, food, gas, and any number of other items.  A net positive economic 
impact occurs when the amount of new spending in a local economy is greater than the amount 
of spending that left the local economy because of the activity or business.  The local economy is 
also called the area of impact, a clearly defined area that determines the boundaries by which to 
measure inflows of new spending and outflows of spending (Brown, Rascher, Nagel, and 
McEvoy, 2010). 
There are three distinct methods to determine the amount of economic impact generated 
by an activity.  Ex ante studies use comparable events to forecast economic impact, concurrent 
studies measure impact at the time of the event by asking people how much they’re spending, 
and ex post studies use measures of spending (like sales tax revenues, per capita income, 
employment, and output) to operationalize the impact after the impact occurs.  While ex ante and 
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concurrent studies normally produce positive estimates of economic impact, ex post studies 
normally produce negative or neutral estimates of economic impact for major league teams (e.g. 
Baade & Dye, 1990; Baade, 1996; Coates & Depken, 2011; Coates & Humphreys, 1999, 2001, 
2003; Lertwachara & Cochran, 2007; Matheson & Baade, 2005) although a few studies have 
found positive results (e.g. Santo, 2006).  Less attention has been paid to minor league teams, but 
recent ex post estimates have shown metropolitan areas that have AAA teams, A+ teams, AA 
stadiums, or rookie stadiums exhibit a positive change in per capita income; an effect opposite to 
that of their major league counterparts (Agha, 2013). 
In light of this research identifying positive impacts for some minor league teams, we 
have found it necessary to review the literature in search of those critical foundational conditions 
that must exist for the possibility of a positive impact to occur.  We believe that clearly 
articulating those conditions will provide the basis by which to evaluate a sports team to 
determine whether it does or does not have the potential to generate a positive impact.  
Essentially, each activity or business is unique in its size, scope, and ability to draw visitors.  In 
addition, every community has a different size, geographical layout, tourist infrastructure, and 
degree of competition with nearby communities.  All of these features and conditions are what 
will ultimately determine if a specific activity or business has a positive impact.  But in the 
broadest sense, the nine theoretical conditions will help explain the results that have been 
generated to date, especially the differing results between major and minor league baseball 
teams. 
Conditions necessary for a positive effect to exist 
This section describes the nine theoretical conditions that must exist in order for a 
positive effect to be present, and analyzes the evidence in the context of major and minor league 
baseball.  
 
1. New Visitors 
First and foremost, a team can spur economic impact to the degree that it exports its 
services outside of the local economy and new spending for the product derives from outside of 
the local economy by visitors who are drawn to the area that would not have spent their money 
there otherwise.  For a team that plays anywhere from 36 (MiLB) to 81 (MLB) home games a 
year, each home game is an opportunity to draw new spending to an economy from the fans who 
travel from outside of the local economy to attend the game.  To generate an impact, these fans 
must bring money from outside the economy and spend it locally on goods and services.  
Traditionally, new visitor spending is measured as new spending on food, lodging, rental cars, 
gas, and other consumer goods/services.  While, on the surface, measuring new visitor spending 
seems clear cut, in practice it is much more difficult.  
“Casuals” are visitors who visit the local economy for a reason besides the team and then 
decided to attend a game once they are in town.  Typically, the new spending from these visitors 
is not included in the economic impact for the team because a casual visitor is drawn to the local 
economy for a reason besides the team.  If for some reason the casual visitor spends more 
because of the team than he or she would have spent otherwise, then the incremental spending 
ought to be counted toward economic impact.  However, the practical matter of determining the 
incremental spending is fraught with hazards so to be conservative, economic impact studies 
typically do not count any spending by casual visitors. 
5 
 
“Time switchers” are those visitors who were planning a trip to the local economy 
anyway and changed the timing of their trip to coincide with a game.  They would have 
generated new spending in the economy without the game, so only the extra spending that 
occurred because of the game is attributable to the economic impact generated by the team.  
Similar to casual visitors, the spending by time switchers is usually not counted as part of 
economic impact in order to be conservative. 
Casuals and time switchers are categories of visitors that can be differentiated only when 
new visitor spending is measured concurrently at an actual event.  These types of studies are rare 
in academic literature (for an exception see Colclough, Daellenbach, & Sherony, 1994) and more 
common in private consulting reports of economic impact.  Despite the lack of peer reviewed 
estimates of new visitors, in both the major and minor leagues there is ample evidence that 
games draw new visitor spending to the area.  
 
MLB 
In MLB, there is a large range in the percentage of visitors to a game (see Table 2).  For 
example, Zipp (1996) reported 52% of Toronto Blue Jays attendees were from outside the local 
area while Baade and Matheson (2001) estimated the percentage for MLB teams to be as low as 
5% (of course, it depends on the definition of the local geographic area).   
Table 2: Percentage of MLB Visitors from Outside the Metropolitan Area 
Author Team Percentage of visitors
Baade & Matheson, 2001 “typical” team 5% - 20% 
Matheson & Baade 2005 St. Louis Cardinals 32% 
Rosentraub & Swindell, 1991 Pittsburgh Pirates 38.7% 
Zipp, 1996 Baltimore Orioles 46% 
Zipp, 1996 Minnesota Twins 47% 
Zipp, 1996 Toronto Blue Jays 52% 
 
With an average 2012 attendance of 30,884 and 81 home games, the annual visitors 
drawn to the area because of a MLB team can range from 125,080 to 1,300,834.  Even after 
accounting for casuals, time switchers, and day trippers there appears to be a considerable 
number of visitors to a metropolitan area because of a team.   
 
MiLB 
Similar to the major leagues, minor league teams report substantial numbers of visitors to 
each game.  For example, Rosentraub and Swindell (1991) report the percentages of out-of-area 
attendees as 20% for the Class-A South Bend White Sox and 60% for the AAA Indianapolis, IN 
minor league baseball teams.  Using 1992 attendance figures for these teams results in 42,790 
and 199,764 visitors, respectively, each year. 
With MLB visitor spending appearing higher than that in MiLB, why might ex post 
empirical estimates of MiLB economic impact be positive, while most studies using similar 
methods for MLB show no impact? 
One possible explanation is that MLB markets are so large compared to the possible 
impact of the local MLB team that any true impact gets swallowed up by other changes in the 
economy (Baade, Baumann, & Matheson, 2008).  In smaller MiLB markets the lower impact 
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from a MiLB team may be more visible in the data although Table 3 shows that this is not 
always the case in MiLB as teams increasingly move to large markets. 
Another explanation could be that new professional stadiums are built to capture an 
increasing share of visitor spending.  Stadiums now include a variety of full service restaurants 
and sports bars in addition to concession stands.  Teams often have sprawling stores that sell 
merchandise.  For example, after the new Yankee stadium was built there were numerous reports 
that merchants outside of the stadium saw decreases in sales of as much as 50% (e.g. McGeehan, 
2009).  Expenditures made in the stadium are captured by the team and are subject to lower 
multipliers than expenditures made outside of the stadium (see 5. Leakages, below).   
Stadiums in the minor leagues are older than the majors (Agha, 2013) and are less adept 
at capturing visitor spending.  With more new visitor spending taking place outside of the 
ballpark, there is a greater likelihood that positive effects will be generated.  To the extent that 
major league stadiums are newer and are more successful at capturing any local spending, this 
may explain why the overall economic effect at the major league level is predominately neutral 
or negative and the effect at the minor league level is positive.  Thus, while MLB reports 
generally more visitors each year to local economies than MiLB, the ability of MLB teams to 
effectively capture the bulk of new visitor spending could explain why lower ex post impacts are 
seen in MLB cities than in MiLB cities. 
 
2. Geographic Isolation 
Zipp (1996) points out that because professional franchises are clustered in roughly the 
30 largest cities in the U.S. and most all other industries are nationally distributed, the real 
impact of a team should be felt locally.  In support of this, some research shows that sports have 
a more pronounced effect on more geographically isolated cities.  Baade and Sanderson (1997) 
proposed that the more a city is geographically isolated (those cities in the West as opposed to 
the population-dense Northeast) the more export revenues will be generated simply because there 
are few locations in the region that host professional sports franchises.  In a geographically 
isolated area, any person wishing to consume a live game will, by definition, have to travel to a 
city that does have a professional team.  This implies that teams located in more isolated 
locations have an increased propensity to generate positive economic impact through both new 
visitor sending (see 1., above) and the increased likelihood for locals to stay locally (see 4., 
below).   
 
MLB 
Winfree, McCluskey, Mittlehammer, and Fort (2004) empirically tested the effect of 
distance between MLB teams and found that teams that are further apart have higher individual 
attendance than teams that are closer together.  In addition, expansion teams further reduced the 
attendance of nearby teams.  Clearly, MLB fans travel to games and when the option is available, 
they travel to teams that are closer. Thus, teams that are more geographically isolated, such as 
the Colorado Rockies, pull new visitor spending from a much larger area than any team located 
on the eastern seaboard.  Further, residents of cities like Denver may be more inclined to stay 
locally to watch MLB games because there are no regional alternatives. 
 
MiLB 
Minor league teams tend to be located in smaller cities than major league teams.  For 
example, Table 3 presents the median population of minor league baseball teams, by 
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classification. Although the maximum and minimum populations indicate that there are minor 
league teams located in the suburbs and fringe cities of large metropolitan areas, the median 
population indicates the majority of minor league clubs are still located in secondary markets.   
 
Table 3: Characteristics of Minor League Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) in 2006, 
by Classsification 
  
Median MSA 
Population* 
Minimum MSA 
Population 
Maximum MSA 
Population 
Average years 
in an MSA 
MLB 4,164,463 1,540,525 18,782,715 24.1 
All Affiliated 494,831 48,247 18,782,715 16.1 
   AAA 1,175,937 469,196 3,262,445 17.2 
   AA 461,502 81,655 5,982,787 13.6 
   A+ 519,414 57,079 5,810,834 18.8 
   A 371,571 48,247 18,782,715 15.6 
   A- 379,862 58,418 18,782,715 15.1 
   Rookie 110,850 65,437 503,820 16.9 
Ind 426,718 75,155 18,782,715 4.6 
Note. Because some A, A-, and Independent teams are located in metropolitan areas with MSA populations over 18 
million the median values reported here are more representative of the actual market size in each classification than 
the average is. 
 
Not only are minor league teams often located in smaller markets, they are also often 
located in cities that are more geographically isolated.  Geographic isolation can be defined in a 
variety of ways.  We use the distance to the nearest MLB team as a proxy for isolation because 
MLB teams are relatively evenly dispersed throughout the U.S. population, in part to deter 
competition1. 
While the population figures in Table 3 indicate that some minor league teams are within 
the boundaries of a large MSA, Table 4 shows that on average minor league teams are generally 
not close to cities large enough to support a MLB team.  Minor league teams in AAA, AA, and A 
classifications are, on average, within a 2 to 3 hour drive to a MLB team.  The range in these 
classifications is large though.  On the other hand, rookie-level teams are incredibly isolated with 
the average team nearly 400 miles from the nearest MLB market.   
 
 
 
                                                 
1 To illustrate our point, we use distance to MLB teams although a MLB game is only 
one example of an alternate leisure activity that is not available in geographically isolated 
markets.  Using different measures (nearest fly fishing river, the nearest amusement park, the 
nearest opera house) we could create a gradient of isolation for different communities. Similarly, 
the Placed Rated Almanac has a recreation index for cities.  A full empirical analysis of this 
matter could use any of these alternate measures of isolation. 
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Table 4: Average Distance between Major and Minor League Markets, 2011 
Classification 
Average Distance 
to the nearest MLB 
team 
Minimum Distance Maximum Distance 
AAA 167 Tacoma Rainiers play 36 
miles from the Seattle 
Mariners 
Salt Lake Bees play 535 
miles from the Colorado 
Rockies 
AA 151 Bowie Baysox play 21 
miles from the Washington 
Nationals 
Mississippi Braves play 
382 miles from the 
Atlanta Braves 
all A's 119 Clearwater Threshers play 
17 miles from the Tampa 
Bay Rays 
Boise Hawks play 503 
miles from the Seattle 
Mariners 
Rookie 386 Greeneville Astros play 
247 miles from the Atlanta 
Braves 
Great Falls Voyagers play 
642 miles from the Seattle 
Mariners 
 
The absence of other professional sporting opportunities within a reasonable drive may 
inspire locals to stay locally for their leisure consumption (also see 4., below) and it may also act 
a driver for new visitor spending for those whose next nearest professional sporting opportunity 
is hundreds of miles away.  Indeed, Gitter and Rhoads (2010a) found that major and minor 
league baseball were substitutes, but only when they were located within 100 miles.  Further 
research by Agha and Cobbs (2012) found that minor league attendance increased for every mile 
further away the parent club was located.  These findings, combined with the distances in Table 
4, lend support for the finding that some minor league teams and stadiums are associated with 
gains in per capita income (Agha, 2013).  
 
3. Locals Change Spending 
Spending by local residents should not be included in economic impact calculations.  By 
definition, economic impact measures new spending whereas spending by locals is generally the 
existing base-level economic activity in a community. 
Economic theory dictates that local consumers have budget constraints on either their 
leisure expenditures or their total expenditures.  A consumer who purchases a ticket to a local 
sporting event will forego that same amount of spending at a local restaurant, bar, theater, opera, 
miniature golf course, or a myriad of other local leisure establishments.  This has been referred to 
as the substitution effect (Crompton, 2006; Okner, 1974)2.  If a team inspires a local resident to 
increase local leisure spending above which occurred before, that resident will have to decrease 
expenditures on food, lodging, or other necessities in the face of a total budget constraint.  Only 
                                                 
2 Even if locals don’t spend more overall when they choose a baseball game over dinner and a movie, they 
do see an increase in their utility by virtue of having chosen one activity over another at the same price.  This is 
more about the quality of life aspect of cultural goods and, as we know, sometimes government finds itself in the 
role of enhancing quality of life for its residents. In this research though, we focus on pecuniary gains instead of 
non-pecuniary gains. 
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if local consumers increased their total local spending in response to a team would the team be 
credited as the source of new economic activity. 
Thus, expenditures from local consumers are included in economic impact calculations in 
only two instances: (a) if sport discourages locals from traveling elsewhere for recreation or 
sporting options (see Section 4 - Locals Stay Locally) or (b) overall aggregate spending increases 
through a decrease in consumer savings or an increase in productivity (Rosentraub & Swindell, 
1991).   
Two techniques have been employed to determine if locals spend more in the presence of 
a team.  The first method is through surveys at events although these results are usually 
proprietary and not publicly available.  The second method is to analyze consumer spending 
when professional sports cease to play.  Strikes and lockouts are natural experiments that allow 
researchers access to aggregate consumer spending data to see if consumers substitute their 
existing levels of leisure expenditures to other leisure expenditures. 
 
MLB 
The conclusion in research on major league sports is that when consumers face a budget 
constraint, new spending on one leisure activity does in fact substitute for another leisure 
activity.  In short, there is no evidence of an increase in local spending.  For example, research 
by Coates and Humphreys (2003) shows there is a transfer of income and jobs between different 
industries in the presence of a team which is indicative of a substitution effect.   
If consumers spend the same amount with or without a team, there will be no changes 
during a strike or lockout.  Yet, during MLB strikes and lockouts Matheson and Baade (2005) 
found an increase in local personal income and Zipp (1996) found an increase in spending in 
about 75% of MLB cities.  These findings suggest that the presence of a team might actually 
suppress local spending.  In other words, it appears that consumers might spend less when a team 
is present and more when it is not.  
This effect has not been observed in all cases.  For example, during work stoppages 
Baade, Bauman, and Matheson (2008) found no significant change in sales tax revenue and 
Coates and Humphreys (2001) found no change in income. No change in either of these 
economic measurements suggests consumers maintain their leisure spending but easily substitute 
spending in one industry for spending in another, as found by Coates and Humphreys (2003).   
While the results are inconclusive as to whether consumers spend less or the same, what 
is clear is that consumers do not spend more in the presence of a team.  Thus, while increased 
spending by locals could theoretically lead to an increase in economic gains, it does not appear to 
be happening in the case of MLB. 
 
MiLB 
No specific empirical research has been conducted on the substitution effect at the minor 
league level but there is no compelling reason to believe the results would be different at the 
minor league level. 
 
4. Locals Stay Locally 
Local consumers also generate a positive pecuniary benefit to a community if a team 
encourages them to stay and spend locally more often that they would have without the team.  
This is known in the tourism industry as “vacationing at home,” taking a “staycation,” or “home 
stayers” (e.g. Cobb & Olberding, 2007; Getz, 1991; Preuss, 2005).   
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MLB 
Although there has been no research in MLB in terms of the number of locals who stay 
locally there is evidence for the effect in other sports. Cobb and Olberding (2007) investigated 
the phenomenon at an annual event and found that marathon runners were more likely to stay 
locally if a race was run in their home town.  The runners substituted spending outside of their 
community with spending locally when possible.  Rascher (2010) also reports substantial 
vacationing at home effects with college football bowl games and college football conference 
championships. 
 
MiLB 
There is also no research on this effect in MiLB cities, although Agha (2013) 
hypothesized the effect is more likely to occur in smaller, geographically isolated communities 
with fewer local entertainment or sporting options.  With external leisure opportunities further 
away, the presence of a team might lead to an increase in local economic activity if it 
discourages locals from traveling outside the area for leisure.   
 
5. Leakages  
The effect of new export spending by visitors is contingent upon the amount that leaves a 
local economy, often referred to as leakages.  Net economic impact is measured as the gains in a 
community net of any loss.  Money can leave an economy for two reasons.  The first is that some 
feature of the team or game creates a situation whereby expenditures are made outside of the 
local economy, thus reducing the amount spent locally.  As an example, if a team pays a band to 
perform in a post-game concert, that money is lost if the band is located outside of the local 
economy and doesn’t spent it in the local economy. 
Second, there are also “natural” outflows of money from a local economy.  No 
community has all of the necessary raw inputs to create the goods and services it needs at the 
best price.  Thus, at some point a business will spend money to import materials necessary for 
production.  For example, a grocery store might send money to Florida in exchange for oranges.  
This normal flow of goods and funds between communities is measured through input-output 
models which generate multipliers for the hundreds of industrial sectors in every community.  
Every dollar spent will recirculate a number of times within a community before eventually 
leaving, thus multipliers measure how many times a dollar spent recirculates.  Table 5 provides 
an example of multipliers for select industries in the greater Boston metropolitan area.  It is clear 
that some industries, such as local public transportation, rely more heavily on local inputs and 
thus have higher multipliers.  Other industries, such as hotels and motels, have lower multipliers 
because they rely more on external inputs.  Ultimately, the amount of leakage generated by a 
team is a function of the features of the team’s spending as well as the industries where new 
spending occurs. 
Table 5: Selected Multipliers for the Greater Boston, MA Metropolitan Area, 2008 
ID Industry Indirect and Induced Effects 
432 Automotive equipment rental and leasing 0.696893 
479 Hotels and motels including casino hotels 0.659313 
481 Food services and drinking places 0.679466 
497 State and local government passenger transit 0.978436 
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MLB 
Team owners, players, concessionaires, and other recipients of consumer expenditures 
tend to remove those dollars from the local economy (Baade & Sanderson, 1997; Siegfried & 
Zimbalist, 2000, 2002).  Because professional sports teams spend approximately 60% of their 
revenues on player payroll, a considerable amount of new spending flows out of the regional 
economy.  This is due to high tax rates, high savings rates, and the location of permanent 
residences of players.  Wealthier individuals are faced with the highest tax rate and send nearly 
40% of their salaries to the federal government (Siegfried & Zimbalist, 2002).  High wealth 
individuals also have a higher savings rate thus pushing local dollars into national money 
markets (Siegfried & Zimbalist, 2000).  Finally, players and owners rarely live year-round in the 
city in which they play, therefore, only a partial amount of their annual expenditures occur 
locally (Siegfried & Zimbalist, 2002).   
Additional leakage occurs when consumers substitute spending away from higher 
multiplier local leisure activities to professional sports (Baade & Sanderson, 1997; Siegfried & 
Zimbalist, 2000).  The export nature of the professional sports industry is different from local 
leisure industries meaning professional sports teams retain less money in the local economy than 
other businesses (Siegfried & Zimbalist, 2000).  For example, Rascher (2010) reports that as 
little as 22% of a team’s expenditures occur locally. 
 
MiLB 
Leakages are higher in smaller communities than in larger ones (Johnson, 1995; Siegfried 
& Zimbalist, 2002).  A small community will have lower multipliers and a higher level of 
leakage because fewer goods and services are available locally.   
But minor league teams themselves have fewer leakages than major league teams for 
three reasons.  First, minor league salaries are very low compared to major league salaries.  At 
most levels, players earn enough for basic local living expenses so little, if any, of their wage 
leaves the local economy.  Second, team profits stay with team owners who are very often local 
residents.  This suggests that local spending on a minor league game will be subject to a higher 
multiplier than when spent on an alternate local leisure activity like a movie where much of the 
profit is sent directly out of the area.  Finally, there are considerable monetary inflows because 
MLB teams pay the salaries of their minor league players which results in a direct economic gain 
to a community. 
Thus while a lower percentage of minor league expenditures leak, the total magnitude of 
expenditures is smaller. 
 
6. Government Spending 
Professional teams affect government spending in at least three major ways: (a) annual 
debt for stadium construction, (b) ongoing stadium operations, and (c) local public services for 
games. 
First, new stadium construction is often financed through local government bonds which 
means one or more local governments are responsible for the annual debt service.  In some cases, 
teams contribute to the annual debt payments through ticket fees, stadium rents, or other 
financial transactions.  In other cases cities are responsible for millions of dollars in debt and 
spending may be diverted to paying off bonds instead of being spent on basic local services.  
There are many instances where cities are responsible for stadium debt even years after a team 
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has left and the facility is no longer in use.  This was the case for Giants Stadium in New Jersey 
where the State of New Jersey still owed about $110 million in debt in 2010 when the new 
stadium for the Giants opened up right next door (Belson, 2010). 
Second, some municipalities are responsible for the ongoing operations and maintenance 
of the stadium.   
Third, communities are responsible for the costs of traffic control, police, public transit, 
trash collection, and other services associated with managing the thousands of fans that attend 
each game.  These public services have real costs that must be absorbed by the city unless the 
team covers some or all of those costs. 
In all three cases, these public expenditures on stadiums and teams may have a negative 
effect on local government budgets.  This can result in either reduced services to those most in 
need or an increase in taxes, both of which will slow the local economy (Siegfried & Zimbalist, 
2000).  An increase in local taxes has further negative effects as a local dollar spent by a resident 
on taxes is a dollar that cannot be spent on local goods and services.  When local spending is 
taxed and used to pay off municipal construction bonds, those dollars leave the local economy 
with no multiplier effects.  In this case, a negative multiplier effect exists whereby disincentive 
effects are created for working, saving, and investing (Keating, 1999).  
 
MLB 
In terms of (a) stadium debt, all current MLB stadiums were built with some public 
subsidy (Long, 2012).  In some cases teams pay rents, share revenues, or otherwise transfer 
money to the city to pay off bonds issued to build the stadium.  But in other cases cities are left 
with long term debt and no revenue stream from the team.  This is the case in Seattle where the 
city will not finish paying off debt for the Seattle Kingdome until 2016 despite the fact that the 
MLB Seattle Mariners last played there in 1999 and the stadium was demolished in 2000 
(Belson, 2010).  Similarly, when the Montreal Expos left Montreal in 2004, the Quebec 
government was still paying stadium debt that began in 1973. 
Rosentraub and Nunn (1978) looked at the case of stadium debt using a case study.  They 
wondered whether communities were able to capture enough new tax revenues to offset stadium 
costs in Arlington, TX (Arlington Stadium for the Texas Rangers) and Irving, TX (Texas 
Stadium for the NFL Dallas Cowboys).  The authors compared these two towns to five similar 
cities in Texas.  They found that sports teams had little impact on Arlington and Irving’s sales 
tax collections although both teams were associated with an increase in property tax collections.  
Unfortunately, Arlington invested so heavily in their MLB stadium that they were only able to 
maintain local services through high debt levels.   
In terms of (b) stadium operating costs, Long (2012) estimates the ongoing maintenance 
expenses in MLB stadiums range from $2-$4 million per year.  Long reports that overall some 
public deals have net positive operating revenues and some have net negative operating 
revenues. 
Finally, in terms of (c) local public services, there are a minimum of 81 days in a year 
when MLB cities mobilize extra fire, police, public safety, traffic control, public transportation, 
and trash services.  These costs are non-trivial in magnitude with estimates from $2 to $5 million 
per year (Long, 2012). While there is often little said about these costs, one recent exception was 
when Washington Nationals fans leaving the park after a 13-inning game found the Metro trains 
had stopped running (Augenstein, 2012).  Unlike the NFL Washington Redskins and the NHL 
Washington Capitals, the Nationals had not placed a deposit of $29,500 with the Washington 
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Metropolitan Area Transportation Authority for the cost of keeping the trains running for an 
extra hour (Roussey, 2012).  A few days later, as it appeared the Nationals would make it to the 
post-season, the team requested the District of Columbia provide extra police, street closures, 
and Metro service for each additional post-season game (Segraves, 2012). 
Coates and Humphreys provide another perspective on the cost of these public services.  
To explain Zipp’s (1996) seemingly counterintuitive finding that spending increased during the 
1994 baseball strike, Coates and Humphreys (2001) proposed that in the absence of games, 
government spending on these services decreases meaning more money may stay with local area 
residents. 
 
MiLB 
In terms of (a) stadium debt, the percentage paid by the public varies between different 
cities although the average for both AAA and Rookie classifications is near 80% (see Table 6).  
Whether teams have successfully contributed to the debt service or whether the city has been left 
with the responsibility for the payment varies from market to market.  For example, in November 
2012, the AAA Reno Aces re-negotiated the terms of their lease so the city of Reno will pay $1 
million from its general fund every year for the next 30 years to cover stadium debt (Duggan, 
2012).  On the other hand, teams like the independent Somerset Patriots have successfully used 
ticket revenue to cover the annual debt service on the city bonds issued to build their $17.7 
million ballpark (Harrington, 2002). 
Table 6: Public Cost of Selected Minor League Stadiums, in millions of 2009 dollars 
Location Original Stadium Name Opened Cost % Public 
AAA     
Richmond, VA The Diamond* 1985 15.9 75%
Colorado Springs, CO SkySox Stadium 1988 6.7 0%
Buffalo, NY Pilot Field* 1988 101.3 93%
Scranton/W.B., PA Lackawanna County Stadium 1989 43.1 44%
Fort Mill, SC Knights Stadium 1990 27.8 100%
Phoenix, AZ Scottsdale Stadium* 1992 12.8 100%
Des Moines, IA Sec Taylor Stadium* 1992 18.3 100%
Norfolk, VA Harbor Park* 1993 23.7 100%
Salt Lake City, UT Franklin Covey Field 1994 31.7 100%
Indianapolis, IN Victory Field* 1996 27.2 50%
Rochester, NY Frontier Field* 1996 56.5 100%
New Orleans, LA Zephyr Field 1997 34.7 81%
Syracuse, NY P&C Stadium* 1997 38.7 100%
Oklahoma City, OK Bricktown Ballpark* 1998 44.9 100%
Tucson, AZ Tucson Electric Park 1998 49.9 100%
Memphis, TN AutoZone Park* 2000 100.0 100%
Louisville, KY Louisville Slugger Field* 2000 49.7 50%
Sacramento, CA Raley Field* 2000 36.6 0%
Dayton, OH Fifth Third Field* 2002 46.4 100%
Fresno, CA Grizzlies Stadium* 2002 54.7 100%
Allentown, PA Coca-Cola Park 2008 49.9 100%
Reno, NV Aces Ballpark* 2009 50.0 100%
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AAA Average   41.8 82%
     
Rookie     
Casper, WY Mike Lansing Field* 2002 4.8 100%
Missoula, MT Missoula Civic Stadium* 2004 11.3 20%
Idaho Falls, ID Melaleuca Field* 2007 5.8 100%
Billings, MT Dehler Park* 2008 12.4 100%
Rookie Average   8.6 80%
Note. The public cost does not include annual operating expenses which, in some cases, may be substantial. The * 
indicates stadiums located downtown or in central business districts 
 
For (b) stadium operating costs, no aggregate information is available for MiLB.  Finally, 
in terms of (c) local public services, minor league cities must also incur the operating costs of 
games.  Because minor league teams play fewer games and have lower attendance, the absolute 
cost is likely lower in minor league cities although in relative terms the impacts may be similar 
in both major and minor league cities.  This is an area that warrants further investigation. 
As a whole, both MiLB and MLB teams rely on government spending to pay for new or 
renovated stadiums, both are responsible for operations and maintenance of stadiums, and both 
are responsible for the costs of local public services to manage the games.  In each case, these 
government expenditures may have a negative effect on local operating budgets which results in 
either a reduction in local services or an increase in taxation.  From the data at hand, it is not 
possible to determine which level of baseball might rely more on government resources.  This is 
clearly another area where further research is needed. 
 
7. New Stadiums  
New stadiums can theoretically contribute to positive economic gains in a community in 
four ways: (a) increased visitor spending from increased attendance at a new stadium, (b) new 
team employment, (c) construction employment and spending, and (d) location in a central 
business district.   
To begin, (a) new stadiums experience a honeymoon effect where attendance increases 
above baseline levels for up to ten years (Clapp & Hakes, 2005; Leadley & Zygmont, 2005; 
McEvoy, Nagel, DeSchriver, & Brown, 2005).  This increased attendance is partially derived 
from visitors who bring new spending to the local economy.  These years of higher than average 
attendance and spending can theoretically lead to positive economic gains.  
If a new stadium is (b) being built for a new expansion team, local employment will be 
positively affected by the need to hire front office staff and stadium crews.  On the other hand, 
when a new stadium is built for an existing team, the team and stadium jobs are simply retained 
and little or no new job creation occurs (Baade & Sanderson, 1997). 
In terms of point (c), common claims by stadium proponents are that new stadiums can 
have a temporary impact through an increase in construction employment and spending.  Despite 
these claims, research has shown construction will create demand for jobs but the impact is only 
positive if there is a surplus of workers.  At full capacity, demand for construction workers 
simply drives up the cost paid by other businesses (Johnson, 1995) or causes workers to shift 
from a non-sports construction job to a sports construction job leaving no net gain in 
construction jobs in the local economy (Miller, 2002).  Construction spending has a similar effect 
on the local economy.  When construction is financed by the local government, these dollars are 
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likely substituted from other local expenditures.  Thus, no new spending takes place, only a 
physical or temporal substitution occurs from other local projects (Porter, 1999).   
Finally, there is some indication that (d) the location of a new stadium can affect the 
degree to which it generates positive pecuniary benefits in the local economy.  When a stadium 
is positioned in a central business district, it can potentially contribute to urban revitalization if it 
is adjacent to other housing and retail development and it is part of a larger development 
program (e.g. Austrian & Rosentraub, 2002; Chapin, 2004; Johnson, 1998; Nelson, 2001, 2002). 
While the construction of a new stadium does not guarantee growth in local income and jobs (see 
(c) above), once built the positive externalities from the team and stadium can provide the focus 
that other businesses need to invest in the actual revitalization (Austrian & Rosentraub, 2002; 
Meder & Leckrone, 2002).  Despite some examples of urban revitalization around new stadiums, 
Wassmer (2001) and Coates (2007) suggest that research showing positive effects of downtown 
stadiums as economic redevelopment tools are simply measuring the substitution of regional 
spending from the suburbs to the central business district. 
 
MLB 
Thirty MLB teams have built or extensively renovated a stadium since 1990.  Each of 
these new venues generates a honeymoon effect that draws more fans and more new visitor 
spending than in the years before the new stadium.  Clapp and Hakes (2005) estimated increased 
attendance over 30% in the first year of a new MLB stadium with the effect returning to baseline 
between six and ten years later.   
In terms of (b) increased employment associated with new teams, there have been four 
new MLB teams since 1990.  Each new team necessitates new employees to run the front office 
and staff the stadium.  While these new jobs increase economic activity, the majority of the jobs 
created are low-paying, seasonal, part-time service sector jobs (Baade, 1996; Miller, 2002; 
Rosentraub, Swindell, Przybylski, & Mullins, 1994).   
Although the popular press makes the claim that (c) new stadiums contribute to the local 
economy through increased spending and employment, a large number of ex ante studies have 
found negative or insignificant effects for stadiums (e.g. Coates and Humphreys, 1999; Miller, 
2002).  
Finally, (d) of the 14 new MLB stadiums built since 2000, 12 are located in or directly 
adjacent to central business districts.  In fact, contrary to most previous research on stadium 
impacts, Santo (2005) found many positive effects of stadiums and teams on local area income.  
He believed that his data, which reflected more modern stadiums built through 2001, and 
stadiums more commonly built in central business districts, explained his positive effects.  The 
San Francisco Giants new ballpark, opened in 2001, is an example of a stadium that drove 
considerable new development to a part of the city that was previously undeveloped.  But new 
stadiums are no guarantee of economic success.  For example, the new Comiskey Park was 
criticized for many years for its failure to integrate with the community and generate growth 
outside of the ballpark (Spirou & Bennett, 2003). Despite Santo’s findings, these examples of 
successful and unsuccessful new development may simply represent a redistribution of regional 
spending from the suburbs to the central business district and not new spending (Coates, 2007; 
Wassmer, 2001)3.    
                                                 
3 Even if new stadiums in central business districts do not drive new revenues it is still possible that they 
have additional positive effects on the environment, commute times, and energy usage in more dense areas (Gerber, 
2010). While these have the potential to increase economic impact (if commute times drop the lower demand for 
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MiLB 
Agha (2013) found AA and rookie stadiums were associated with gains in per capita 
income but it was not possible to attribute the positive effect to the actual construction.  It is 
equally likely the effect stemmed from increased visitor spending (see 1., above), locals staying 
locally (see 4., above), venue usage (see 8., below), or regional development. 
In terms of the (a) honeymoon effect, Gitter and Rhoads (forthcoming) found new minor 
league baseball stadiums increase attendance at the AAA, AA, and A levels.  In addition, Roy 
(2008) identified a honeymoon effect with the largest gain seen in teams that moved to new 
replacement stadiums built within the same market. Additional anecdotal evidence in the minor 
leagues also confirms honeymoon effects exist.  For example, a newspaper article from Tulsa 
(Davis, 2008) states, “Take the Springfield [MO] Cardinals for example.  Its stadium, Hammons 
Field, was completed in 2004.  The word spread and baseball fans from St. Louis and across 
Missouri made the trek to see what the buzz was all about.”  To the extent that this increase in 
attendance derives from visitors, the local economy will benefit.  This effect appears to be 
relatively equivalent between MLB and MiLB. 
Because minor league baseball teams move much more often than MLB teams, in any 
given year there are multiple minor league cities that have a new team (b).  No empirical 
research has estimated job impacts at the minor league level, but the reality of minor league 
staffing suggests any effect would be severely limited, although it may vary between 
classifications.  For example, because minor league teams play between 36 and 71 home games a 
year, teams rely on part-time seasonal workers and interns to staff both the front office and the 
games. 
New construction spending and employment (c) have not been directly investigated at the 
minor league level.   
Similar to Santo’s (2005) findings in MLB, the minor league stadium effect at the AA 
and rookie levels (Agha, 2013) may be driven by (d) the location and developmental logic of 
these stadiums instead of the actual construction spending or employment gains.  Minor league 
teams in Louisville, Toledo, and Durham, to name a few, have purposefully built stadiums 
downtown as part of revitalization efforts (Chapin, 2004).  Table 6 identifies stadiums located in 
central business districts with asterisks and shows AAA and rookie teams are increasingly 
building stadiums in downtown districts. 
Overall, it is not possible to determine whether MLB or MiLB markets are more affected 
by new stadiums.  Agha and Coates (2013) estimated the per capita cost of stadiums built since 
2002 were $77.91 in MLB, $71.42 in AAA, and $53.16 in rookie markets suggesting that as a 
whole, the net effect is very similar. 
 
8. Venue Utilization 
The utilization of a stadium is of vital importance in generating positive pecuniary 
benefits.  Jones (2012) reports that football stadiums are used an average of 23 days in a year and 
arenas are used an average of 197 days. Each additional day of use creates additional exports 
which can potentially positively affect employment, income, and local sales tax revenues but can 
also potentially drain other local consumption activities.   
                                                                                                                                                             
energy lowers prices for energy which frees up money for other things) we focus on the more direct case of 
economic impact derived from new visitor spending. 
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The excess capacity in professional venues has led to the creation of alliances between 
stadium owners to increase usage.  In the NFL, the Gridiron Stadium Network attracts high 
profile concerts that gross over $4 million per venue by assuming the financial risk and acting as 
the promoter (Dreir & Muret, 2011).  Similarly, in 2011 seven Major League Soccer (MLS) 
teams formed the Soccer Stadium Alliance to increase revenue streams through increased venue 
usage for concerts and other events. 
 
MLB 
MLB stadiums are used an average of 120 days each year (Jones, 2012).  As new 
stadiums are increasingly built with non-baseball uses in mind, teams have increased the number 
of corporate events, parties, concerts, and community events.  The degree to which this occurs 
varies dramatically.  For example, the San Francisco Giants have a separate business entity, 
Giants Enterprises, which is fully responsible for non-baseball events.  Their website offers 18 
different categories of events and boasts, “AT&T Park is Open for Anything!”  On the other 
hand, there were so few events at Petco Park that in 2012 the San Diego city council attempted to 
increase the number of off-season events by renegotiating the revenue sharing agreement they 
had with the team (City New Service, 2012). 
 
MiLB 
Minor league facilities are often built with the community in mind (Johnson, 1995).  
Minor league teams may be more successful than others in utilizing the venue for events that 
drive economic activity.  Examples of events that have been held in minor league stadiums 
include ice skating, marching band competitions, high school football and baseball games, 
amateur events, concerts, holiday gatherings and parades, exhibits, trade shows, Special 
Olympics, movies, track meets, fireworks, banquets, and company picnics.  Every additional day 
of venue use provides another opportunity to drive visitor spending.   
For example, the Sacramento River Cats, a successful AAA team, host the Rhythm and 
Ribs food and music festival, corporate meetings, concerts, and other events (Rayasam, 2007).  
The Joliet Slammers, an independent Frontier League team playing at Silver Cross Field reported 
that they host 51 regular season games, 2 exhibition games, 25 college baseball games, over 20 
high school baseball games, 6 events to provide disabled children access to baseball, plus parties 
(weddings, banquets, graduations, reunions, bachelor, and bachelorette), business events 
(corporate meetings, trade shows, seminars), and other miscellaneous events like concerts, yard 
sales, movies, picnics, and fantasy draft parties (Joliet Slammers, 2013). 
While both major and minor league teams are increasingly booking their stadiums for 
alternate uses, minor league cities, through their small and geographically isolated nature, will 
naturally drive more visitor spending for these events than will major league teams, or the 
minimum cost to open a venue for an event is much lower in minor league parks, making many 
more events at these parks possible. 
 
9. Crowding Out 
The ability of a professional sports franchise to generate positive pecuniary benefits in 
the local economy is also dependent on the degree of crowding out.  This phenomenon is often 
over-looked and difficult to quantify (Baade et al., 2008; Crompton, 1995).  In the simplest 
terms, crowding out can take the form of locals changing travel and spending habits and not 
venturing near a stadium when a game is taking place (the “hunker-down effect” as in Coates & 
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Depken, 2009), normal business or leisure travelers avoiding a local economy when a game is 
occurring (known as reverse time-switchers), or local area residents purposefully leaving the 
local economy to avoid an event (the “skeddadle effect” as in Coates & Depken, 2009).  The 
latter two are most common during mega-events, but in all of these cases, normal local economic 
activity is reduced below its regular level meaning any gains from an event must offset the loss 
in order for the community to simply “break even.”  For example, when looking at crowding out 
for regular season college football games in Texas, Coates and Depken (2009) found no change 
in sales tax revenues suggesting any gains from visitors were offset by reductions in other local 
spending.  However, if the money that would have been spent by locals, but instead stayed in the 
pockets of those hunkering down, is then spent later on in the local economy, then it isn’t a loss 
to the local economy.  Yet, even when looking at one month intervals, Coates & Depken (2009) 
found no change in overall sales tax collections. 
In more technical terms, crowding out begins with demand.  In a market with binding 
capacity constraints, demand drives up prices which causes buyers to seek substitute products.  If 
these substitute products are only available outside the local economy then new visitor spending 
does not occur locally and impact decreases.  Thus, a fully productive economy will benefit less 
than one that has excess capacity (Baade & Sanderson, 1997; Porter, 1999). 
The biggest concern with crowding out generally occurs during one-off, large scale 
events.  In these cases several industrial sectors reach or exceed capacity, high demand drives 
prices up, the demand crowds out other activity, and thus reduces any economic impact.  The 
question in baseball is if a series of regularly occurring games induces (a) the most extreme form 
of crowding out where capacity constraints and price increases impede new visitor spending or 
(b) the simplest form of crowding out where local residents change travel and spending habits. 
 
MLB 
Crowding out has been identified as a probable explanation for the low or negative ex 
post effect for a variety of All-Star games, championship games, and mega-events (e.g. Porter, 
1999; Baade & Matheson, 2000, 2001, 2004a, 2004b).  Although no research has been conducted 
to very specifically isolate crowding out effects of regular season MLB games, there is some 
evidence that the most extreme form of crowding out does not exist.  For example, the average 
occupancy rate in the 27 MLB markets is 61% during the off-season and 71% in-season (which 
is also travel season).  The number of excess rooms available on any given night is over 17,000 
and the average daily room rate rises during the season from $112.44 to $114.63 in the 27 MLB 
markets (Smith Travel Research, 2013). 
If crowding out occurs during the regular MLB season its effect is most likely to be in (b) 
the altered travel and spending habits of local residents. Although no empirical in-season 
crowding out research has been conducted for MLB, a report prepared for the Federal Highway 
Administration describes sporting events as “significant contributors to noncommuter 
congestion” (Cambridge Systematics, 2005).  Similarly, the San Francisco Metropolitan 
Transportation Agency warns drivers to be prepared for heavy traffic when Giants games begin 
or end near regular commute times (SFMTA, 2013).  Ultimately, we suspect each person reading 
this can remember at least one time when the thought of sitting in a sport-related traffic jam 
resulted in a change of travel or spending plans. 
 
MiLB 
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It is unknown whether minor league teams experience more or less crowding out than 
major league teams.  Although one might suspect that a smaller city may have a smaller tourism 
infrastructure and thus be unable to accommodate the fans who might be traveling to the city for 
the game, the numbers do not appear to support this.  
 
Table 7: Estimates of Capacity in Minor League Baseball Markets 
 
AAA 
Indianapolis Indians
(1992) 
AAA 
Indianapolis Indians 
(2011) 
Rookie 
Helena Brewers
(2011) 
Total attendance 332,941 580,082 37,468 
Home games 72 72 38 
Attendance per game 4,624 8,057 986 
Visitors per game* 2,775 4,834 592 
% Day trippers** 37% 37% 37% 
Visitors who spend the 
night 1,748 3,045 373 
Total Hotel rooms 19,553 31,641 1,469 
Occupancy rate during 
baseball season 68.5% 61.4% 66.8% 
Available rooms, each 
night, on average 6,159 12,213 487 
* We use Rosentraub and Swindell’s (1991) report of 60% of out of area visitors. 
** We use an estimate from the NHL Sharks that 37% of visitors were day-trippers in 2009 
(SportsEconomics, LLC, 2008). 
 
Table 7 summarizes attendance and visitor information for the AAA Indianapolis Indians 
and the Rookie Helena Brewers.  Both cities have hosted minor league teams for well over 20 
years and thus these represent markets with strong minor league attendance.  We also use the 
Indianapolis Indians because Rosentraub and Swindell (1991) reported that 60% of the Indians 
attendance came from visitors.  Further, based on the NHL Sharks 2009 season, we estimate that 
37% of the visitors are day trippers.  Total hotel rooms and average occupancy rates during the 
summer were supplied Smith Travel Research (2013).  Even in the extreme case where 60% of a 
team’s attendees are visiting from outside the local area, it appears that minor league cities at the 
AAA and rookie levels have sufficient capacity in the hotel sector and would not be affected by 
crowding out. 
In terms of (b) locals changing travel and spending habits, we offer an example in the 
absence of empirical research.  Given that Helena High School, the larger of two high schools in 
Helena, has a student population of 1,569, it seems hard to imagine that a crowd of 986 people 
headed to the Helena Brewers baseball game would affect the 28,592 residents any more than the 
daily commute of high school students. 
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Thus, while it is doubtful that regular season games in either MLB or MiLB induce (a) 
large-scale crowding out that reduces visitor spending, there is some evidence that MLB, but not 
MiLB, induces (b) changes in local travel and spending habits associated with traffic, congestion, 
and large crowds. 
 
Discussion 
 
Table 8 summarizes the findings for each of the nine conditions explained above.  In 
some cases, there are no clear differences between MLB and MiLB. Interestingly, the conditions 
that have a larger effect on total impact are the conditions where we see the most differences 
between MLB and MiLB.  Specifically, when measured in magnitude, the effect of locals 
increasing spending is much smaller than the gains from new visitor spending or higher venue 
utilization.  On the cost side, crowding out and leakages have large effects.   
   
Table 8: Nine Conditions Applied to MLB and MiLB 
 MLB MiLB
1. New visitors Yes, but less 
spending captured 
locally 
Yes, but more 
spending captured 
locally 
2. Geographic isolation Rarely Often
3. Locals change spending No No 
4. Locals stay locally Perhaps Perhaps 
5. Leakages Higher Lower
6. Government spending Yes Yes 
7. New stadium Almost all teams Increasingly yes 
8. Venue utilization More likely low More likely high 
9. Crowding out Higher Lower or none 
 
 
This analysis begins to provide an explanation for the common ex post empirical result 
that major league sports have negative or neutral effects on their local communities.  Major 
league cities realize new visitor spending, but little of it is captured outside of the stadium.  
Major league markets experience higher leakages, more crowding out, and lower venue 
utilization. 
Despite the fact that major league teams do not meet many of the conditions necessary 
for economic gain described above, there are many reasons to suspect that minor league teams 
may be fundamentally different from major league teams.  MiLB teams are more geographically 
isolated which increases visitor spending and inspires locals to stay locally.  New visitor 
spending is more likely to be captured locally, there is less crowding out, lower leakages, and 
higher venue utilization. 
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In spite of the smaller size of minor league sports, its fundamental structure may be 
different enough to allow positive benefits to accrue to the local economy, especially small local 
economies, and thus help explain Agha’s (2013) findings. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper was four-fold.  First, it distills our understanding of economic 
impact into nine conditions that alone or in combination allow for a team to generate economic 
impact in its host community.  Second, these conditions create a platform by which to explain 
our current understanding of the economic impacts of team sports.  Third, when applied to MLB 
and MiLB these conditions generate reasonable explanations for why we find some positive 
impacts in MiLB and negative or neutral impacts in MLB.  Finally, in applying these conditions 
to the context of major and minor league baseball, we illuminate the immense need to add 
explanatory research to the abundant descriptive research that has chronicled the economic 
impact of major league sports throughout the past 40 years. 
Despite the gaps in explanatory research, we compiled what research there is, added 
illustrative examples, and showed that despite popular opinion to the contrary, it is entirely 
reasonable that major league teams do not generate economic impacts because of their large 
leakages and crowding out effects.  Moreover, despite the seemingly counterintuitive finding that 
some minor league baseball teams have positive impacts, it is entirely reasonable that the 
benefits of minor league teams result from their geographic isolation, high venue utilization, and 
low levels of leakages and crowding out.  The nine conditions may vary across teams, leagues, 
cities, and sports and thus the true underlying economic impact even within a sport may vary 
across cities. 
While this research has created a theoretical understanding of economic impact and 
reasonably explained existing economic impact results, perhaps the most enduring outcome will 
be the academicians who investigate the many areas that we have highlighted where more 
research is needed.  
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